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Abstract. As far as one is concerned by security in virtual embedded
systems, one can say that many ideas or implementations exist today but
not really as a global solution and not really in the open-source world.
Our goal is to bring a security solution up-to-date and new to build-up
a solution from the hardware to an end-user application located in a
virtual machine (VM).
The idea of this article is to focus on the lack of secure solutions that
can help virtualization and communication which can be implemented on
new hybrids (Core + FPGA) development platforms. On one side, these
boards are featured with processors that do not have virtualization ex-
tensions but are powerfull enough to really support hypervisors and their
guests. On the other side some virtualization solutions presently exist for
ARM processors but they only refer to TrustZone for their (hardware)
security. These hybrid boards can offer us more: we have read some re-
cents and up-to-date specifications made by a consortium to help the
implementation of hardware security. In this area, FPGA can help in
securing virtualization. But we must notice that, for now, all has been
made for Intel/AMD architectures and for a lone operating system. Even
so, the whole propositions are too complex to be implemented on em-
bedded systems. So, we will have to use some capabilities in hardware
development and make software rearrangements to help us to design a
functional solution.
Keywords: TCG, TPM, Embedded security, Cryptographic primitives, Virtu-
alization, Embedded systems, Xen hypervisor, Hardware-software codesign
1 Introduction
Up to some years ago, mainly high-performance processors, such as those in
servers and desktops, were powerful enough to support virtualization. This was
mainly used at software level to provide isolation, security services and resources
sharing. Today, even processors for embedded systems can also efficiently support
virtualization. But on top of isolation and protection against software attacks,
embedded systems have also to face hardware attacks such as side channel at-
tacks (SCAs). Hence, virtualization for embedded systems requires a combined
hardware/software (HW/SW) approach. In this paper, we first provide an im-
portant review and analyze state-of-art solutions. Second, we describe our own
solution. We study an embedded virtualization solution based on HW IPs and
a SW stack for efficiently protecting the system against SW attacks. Security
against SCAs comes from the use of optimized and SCA-protected hardware IPs
for primitives such as symmetric/asymmetric cryptography and true random
number generation (TRNG). Using this HW/SW approach, we expect better
performances, security and lower power consumption compared to software so-
lutions. Our system is implemented in a Zynq-7000 HW/SW platform composed
of a processor (ARM Cortex-A9 dual-core) and a FPGA (Artix-7) in the same
device. For the SW stack, we use a derived version of the Xen hypervisor. In order
to offer efficient, robust and low-power integrity, confidentiality and authentica-
tion primitives, we use a minimal list of existing HW IPs: AES (256 bits) for
symmetric encryption/decryption, ECC (between 192 and 256 bits), RSA (2048
bits), TRNG, SHA-2 (256 bits). In addition to these HW IPs, we have to add
a few other HW blocks: I/O interface between HW and SW, various internal
memories (for Platform Configuration Registers (PCR) and keys), control and
execution engine (for the HW part of implemented security policies). At the SW
level, we adapted a Xen-like hypervisor to our HW architecture. Our SW code
links the various virtual machines (VMs), the management VM (Dom0) and the
hardware architecture. The proposed HW architecture and SW stack allows the
end user to launch VMs where the executed code is trusted (i.e. verified and
the user is granted) and the manipulated data are also trusted (i.e. integrity is
ensured and only authorized users have access to these data inside the complete
HW/SW platform).
In a first part of this document we will look at the state of the art in our domain
of research to get a strong idea of what can be done including the threats of
these implementations or proposed implementations. In a second part we will
explain the choices made for this work and explain the design of the proposed
solution (hardware and software). In a third part of this document, we will con-
clude and present the work still in progress. Finally, we will make plans about
future developments.
2 State of the Art
In a global point of view, we will have to look at three domains: hardware,
existing software virtualization solutions in the open-source world and concepts
of trusted computing which can link both of them. Then, we will study the
threats in those domains that one must tackle in our solution.
2.1 FPGA and ARM Cores
To deal with embedded systems, one has two possibilities: ASICs and FPGAs.
ASICs are non-programmable but they can use software intensively. They are
included in ”ready-to-use” systems on chip (SoCs) with their board support
package (BSP) and software distributions the user can immediatly install. Most
popular are linux-based ones. We can find different sorts of CPU inside: Intel’s
Atom, AMD’s G-series, Freescale’s PowerPC e300, ARM’s Cortex-M series or
adaptated IP cores for specific usages. These SoCs fit very well for a general
use or students researchs. Some of them are designed for special purposes and
include some safety/security like cryptographic accelerators, trusted boot capa-
bilities, efuses possibilities. But we don’t get all the detailed specifications for
these elements and they have few or no programming capacities. At least they
can’t upgrade their software ou hardware due to weaknesses (newly discovered
vulnerabilities, bugged soft or hard implementation and age). On the other side,
FPGAs are black boards and have to be implemented from scratch with all the
needed IP plus another special software development (i.e the firmware) for the
board support package. For a standalone FPGA board an extra softcore proces-
sor should be implemented on it. For a combined development, one can plug a
FPGA daughter card into a board containing a processor which result in connec-
tions that must be secured between the board and the FPGA. This may cause
latencies. To help using FPGAs, few years ago, some hybrid platforms have been
produced (Arria or Cyclone based from Altera and Artix or Kintex from Zynq-
7000 Xilinx). These two boards have approximately the same architecture for
the first designs depending upon the exact reference as shown in figure 1.
Equipment Atlera’s CycloneV Xilinx’s Artix-7
Processor
1× 800 MHz
dual-core ARM
Cortex-A9
1× 800 MHz
dual-core ARM
Cortex-A9
Connexion between
logic and processing
1× 128-bit write
AXI4 bus, 1×
128-bit read AXI4
bus, 1× 32-bit
Advanced Peripheral
Bus (APB) port
4× 32-bit AXI4 bus
and 4× 64-bit AXI4
bus
On chip memory 64 ko
256 KB (192 KB for
users)
logic elements up to 110 K up to 235 K
Fig. 1. Short comparison of two low-cost hybrid systems.
The Zynq-7000 is the only development board immediatly avaliable at low-
cost on the market at the end of this state of the art. All the components are
present to consider the realization of projects that had never been made before
on such a board. They can provide a secure/authenticated boot with Xilinx
credentials which can be replaced by user-provided secure boot up to a certain
extent. They also offer partial reconfiguration possibilities even if it must be
manually done with the last Vivado version (2014.3) and one has to purchase a
special license for it.
On these boards, one can boot the device under several modes but in this work we
only consider secure modes (encrypted and signed). And for this boot mode, one
have again 4 possibilities (Flash, QSPI, NAND and NOR). The BootROM is on
the processing system (PS) side along with the hash of the RSA public key (for
authentication) and 256 kB. of on-chip memory (OCM). On the programmable
logic (PL) side one find 2 engines: one AES-256 for decryption purposes and one
HMAC SHA-256 for authentication purposes plus efuses, battery backed RAM
(BBRAM) and configuration registers. The secure flow of booting, on figure 2,
depends on two operation. One the PC side, the bootgen tool generates first
the HMAC which is followed by AES encryption then the hash of the partition
will be signed with RSA private key. On the Zynq side, the bootROM code
will authenticate the FSBL’s partition and the FSBL will then authenticate the
partition, decrypt it and authenticate it.
Fig. 2. The complete secure flow for the Xilinx’s Zynq-7000 board.[29]
Considering these hybrid boards, both work with an ARM processors de-
signed with 2 Cortex-A9. ARM ”secure extension” called TrustZone is present.
But, mainly because this extension is ”secure”, we don’t know if the PS of the
Zynq-7000 allow playing with such a device and if it does, under which condi-
tions of intellectual property. The Cortex-A9 CPU is the last one of the ARMv7
family which does not have virtualization extensions. New ARM Cortex-A15
and the next-to-come ARMv8 family will have them with a new processor mode
helping in hypervisor execution (HYP). This new processor execution mode in-
troduces a 2-walk memory page translation. Another add-on, the large physical
address extension (LPAE), will allow to have more than 4 GB of memory but is
not avaliable on the Zynq.
2.2 Virtualization on ARM Cores
Virtualization is not a new idea. Its concepts have been well defined in a book:
Virtual Machines [21]. Unfortunately, nearly all the functional hypervisors have
been made for the INTEL x86 architecture. There are few hypervisors working
on ARM cores and very few of them are open-source. One keep closed-source
commercial OS out of the scope of our work mainly because their hypervisors
are licensed and modifications impossible for a research work.
First of all, one must remind that the used type of virtualization will depend on
what ARM core family is used. On ARMv7 family, only software virtualization
will be possible. On ARMv7+ (Cortex-A15) and ARMv8 family, both software
and hardware virtualization can be considered.
Sierraware 1 has developped Sierra hypervisor which runs on ARM cores. The
sources can be downloaded but the Zynq-7000 version has only a binary version.
No further implementation (i.e. modifications of kernel sources) will be possible
with this hypervisor. Xtratum 2 is an other hypervisor running on ARM plat-
forms but it is very difficult to get the source code. The version we worked on
was the 3.2 one and vTPM were implemented on software. Xen ARM (para-
virtualized or not) 3 developed a well suited hypervisor for ARM cores but
nothing for the Zynq yet. We have no time to implement such a version. An im-
plementation of Xen on an ARM-base smartphone called ”secure Xen” has been
made in 2008 that shows to be a valuable solution. This document is very helpful
in terms of howto [20]. More than this, Samsung designed a new extension on
Xen for ARMv7 cores to enable a divided user mode and allow the guest OS be
”more isolated” from a guest application [7]. This approach is now superseded
by ARM’s HYP mode. x-hyp 4 is a new french little hypervisor for ARM world
but only runs on QEMU by the time this paper is written. Finally one can see
that all these hypervisors do not offer hardware based solutions for a secured
virtualization.
We finally found EmbbededXen. A work made by the ”Haute Ecole d’Inge´nierie
et de Gestion du canton de Vaud” (Switzerland)5 for which the source code
is available and runs on a Zynq-7000 platforms [17]. A further implementation
has been realized on a HTC desire smartphone. This little hypervisor has great
qualities for our works: all the source code (hypervisor, Dom0 and DomU) is in-
cluded in only one binary file making it easy to upload to the board via NFS or
put in flash memory, it is u-boot compatible (so is the Zynq), some security has
been deployed on RAM management, hypercalls/syscalls not used in Xen mode
and they have initiated a particular mode. The presented work is well mature
enough to try to add some new features to it. This project is still in progress
and the hypervisor seems easy to manage for prototyping.
1 http://www.sierraware.com/arm hypervisor.html
2 http://www.fentiss.com/en/products/xtratum.html
3 http://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/XenARM
4 http://x-hyp.org
5 http://www.heig-vd.ch/rad/reds
2.3 Trusted Computing
The trusted computing group (TCG) was primary involved in desktop PC and
huge servers but was not really organized for embbeded world and virtualiza-
tion. Their specifications for virtualization [25] have been published in 2011 and
should still been in effect. More than this, virtualization is still considered as an
independant domain besides embedded systems. Facing the trend, TCG worked
hard to publish a white paper: TPM MOBILE with Trusted Execution Envi-
ronment for Comprehensive Mobile Device Security [26]. This solution involves
greatly the TrustZone and a great part of the trust should depend on it.
But one can’t speak about trust computing without mentionning Trusted Plat-
form Modules (TPM) which are the heartbeat of a trusted solution. A version
called 1.2 has been widely deployed (over 100’s of millions of chips) but is now
out-of-age due to scientific improvements on the domain of malicious computing.
The up-to-date version is the newly revision 01.07 published in may 2014 which
is called ”family 2.0” whose total specifications represent more than 1000 pages.
The first functional TPM (v1.2) is now obsolete and 2.0 specifications aim at
giving more insurance. TPM 1.2 had some limitations and the first one is its age:
2003. In terms of cryptography, only SHA1 and RSA 2048 are fully supported
because the US government wanted to avoid exposed symmetric for export con-
cerns. To protect confidentiality, RSA2048’s key of 112 bits is not strong enough
nowadays [11]. To build a policy, this version of TPM had only 3 authorization
elements (Authorization value, PCR state and locality) to be combined for a
total of 8 possibilities. In terms of target, this version only aimed at desktop
PC. The insurance given by the chip could be deactivated from the BIOS by a
user. The owner of the TPM controlles all the security and privacy functions.
TPM 2.0 version has an easier way to define security to their ”owners”. There
are 3 separate domains: security (to protect the security of an user), privacy (to
expose the identity of the platform/user) and platform (to protect the integrity
of the platform services) and for each domain we find proper resources and con-
trols. When one found only one hierarchy for the platform OS which is the user
(for the storage) with the former TPM, one has now 2 more: one platform hi-
erarchy to be used by the BIOS and one endorsement hierarchy for the TPM
identification. Each hierarchy has its own resources (primary seed to generate
EK, enable flag, authorization value, authorization policy). 12 authorization el-
ements and a newborn security policy based on logical AND and OR gives fine
grained access control over TPM keys or data like authorization value, locality,
PCR state, time limited, duplication, and so on. Some other explanations are
presented in this article [12]. Finally, PCRs can use many hash algorithms and
doing so, an extension of a PCR must now include the hash and the ID of the
used algortihm. Those versions are therefore and, for good, incompatible.
Boot process is the unavoidable base to build a secure chain of trust. First, boot
ROM acts as the hardware root of trust for verification (RTV) and forms the
start of the root of a transitive chain of verification. The software in the boot
ROM locates the first boot phase software in some form of non-volatile storage.
The boot ROM could then performs the following sequence of operations:
1. Measures the located image and determines the validity of the measurement,
2. Checks that the version number stored within the image is valid,
3. If all checks have passed, then the device executes the loaded software.
Secure boot is then used only for the early-booted device firmware up to the
point of launching the main operating system (OS) boot loader. Whenever an
additional module of firmware code (or a data file in some cases) is loaded, the
following steps are executed:
1. The code module is measured,
2. The validity of the measurement is determined,
3. If a storage mechanism such as a TPM is available, the measurement is
extended into that storage, otherwise it is discarded.
If the Boot ROM is trustworthy, code that fails validation will not be launched
during the secure boot process. At last, measured Boot is the process followed
once a TPM is available during the boot process to carry on the build of the
complete trusted process to its end as illustrated in figure 3.
To allow a program to have access to a TPM chip, a software interface must
Fig. 3. State-of-Art of a complete secure boot chain.
be provided which is called Trusted Software Stack (TSS) in the TCG terminol-
ogy. 3 interesting works have been found on this topic. The first one [23] was
about a micro-TSS and has been later quoted by the German Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) 1. For full open-source implementation of a TSS one
can follow two projects: Trousers in C language 2 existing since 2005 and jTSS
written in java language 3 since 2008. All these works are of utmost interest for
their deep study of the mechanisms even if designed for TPM v1.2 family.
It could seem to be a very good ideas to implement all the specifications in mo-
tion with the help of a large FPGA but it’s impossible in a environment where
1 https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Studies/TSS Apps/TSS-
Apps en.pdf? blob=publicationFile
2 http://trousers.sourceforge.net
3 http://trustedjava.sourceforge.net
resources are limited. So one has to wonder about their adequation to embedded
system. A guide has recently been produced by the US Department of Commerce
[10]. This guide can be seen as an ”approval” of the TCG specifications because
most of its requirements may be satisfied by the TCG. Some other rules can be
viewed as an expansion. But in our case, the TPM and its virtual counterparts
(vTPM) will have to make a lot adjustments to cope with restrictions on silicon
area, energy, power to fullfil the platform constraints. In theory, they seems to
be clones of each other and their functionalities are enumerated in figure 4.
Here, we must notice that some european projects try to implement a physical
realization of Trust in embedded computing [15] but, in 2010, it was in ver-
sion 1.2 and recently, in june 2013, by the Institute for Applied Information
Processing and Communication (IAIK) of Graz University of Technology, Aus-
tria, where a whole TPM v2.0 platform has prototyped on a Spartan3A FPGA 1.
Fig. 4. In concrete terms, TPM and an vTPM should look like that meaning that all
the functionalities must be present but may be shared.
For the virtual TPM, a basis solution has been explain in [22]and illustrated
in figure 5. This first solution was solely software. Later, other were published.
One get the feeling of it and deployed an exclusively hardware-based solution
with a vTPM for each VM [24]. One presented a paravirtualized TPM solution
which shared TPM and vTPM in only one instance [6]. Another one implement
1 http://trust2013.sba-research.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Martin-Pirker.pdf
a property based TPM-vTPM solution [19]. But none of these solutions applied
to ARM processors and they were too old to get the Zynq-7000 capabilities into
account and the new specifications of the TPM v2.0.
Fig. 5. The mostly implemented solution in para-virtualized hypervisors [22].
2.4 Threats
As one consider threats at the scope of an entire SoC, one will have to look at
the whole scope of possible vulnerabilities and later only have a glance at those
which could create a vulnerability of our study concerns.
Attackers who can exploit the vunlerabilities of a SoC can be divided into 3
classes: 1 kiddies with little knowledge, engineers with solid knowledge and funds
and finally states or organized crime which include terrorism. Their objectives
will also be different depending on the range of the power they own (personnal
challenge, technologic race or spy/cyberwarfare). For a SoC like Zynq-7000, one
must care about 3 categories of vulnerabilities that exists: hardware, FPGA and
software (virtualization). Network threats will be less studied because the fact
that the network stack is badly coded or the network protocole not respected is
not of our concerns.
At the lower level, there are a lot of threats for microelectronic hardware which
could also be classified in 3 categories:
1. Backdoor in hardware
2. Hardware vulnerability
3. Hardware assisted malware.
1 http://watchguardsecuritycenter.com/2013/05/30/hacker-profiles/
Most of these malwares can be found at production level. A malicious modifica-
tion of hardware is more than possible. It can provide a very good advantage to
opponents and worst in the case of security or critical domains. Here the vulner-
ability is at the Hardware Design Language (HDL). If the firm is fabless risks are
greater. The supply chain for integrated circuits (IC) should be trusted from the
designers to the end-users. Exploiting hardware vulnerabilities can lean to put
a rootkit somewhere on it. For example, the Raksasha malware 1 built-on with
free softwares supports about 230 x86 architecture motherboards. This bootkit
is possible due to 30 years old mandatory compatibility of the Intel hardware
architectures 2. Updating/upgrading an obsolete hardware is no more an accu-
rate solution.
For FPGAs, there are also sources of trouble. If not protected, a bistream could
be counterfeited, cloned or stolen. The resulting effects of these threats, appart
from economic and social damage, are that reliability will certainly decrease
and security/safety won’t be assured anymore. In critical systems like military,
aerospace or medical, results can be human death.
About threat on virtualized environments, one must consider that there are two
sorts of possible attacks: those that are specific to general purpose computing
and those that are specific to virtualization. In this article, we only focus on
virtualization-specific threats.
Compromizing the underlying hypervisor can be possible due to a physical vul-
nerability: on boot, legacy BIOS could be infected by a bad code that could
corrupt the following startup sequence. Later, on the hypervisor side, the results
can be a compromized hypervisor that has implemented hidden functions, in-
stallation of another malicious hypervisor (example: blue pill Virtual Machine
Monitor (VMM) rootkit) and at last a deactivation of the targeted hypervisor.
It would be then possible for an attacker to try to modify one of the VMs before
they start.
Managment interfaces can then be the target of an attacker. In case it is run-
ning under a well-known vulnerable operating systems (OS), the task should be
easier. Threat can also come from network or a compromized guest that could
”escape” off its cage.
At upper level, a guest can be the target of attacks from Internet or from an
already compromized guest. A simple goal could be to try spying the activity
in an hypervisor or another VM. An infected application could do a sequence
of instructions that it was not supposed to do inducing a possible leak of infor-
mations. These malicious actions conduct malware programmers to adapt their
attack technics to this new playing ground: the possibility for a malware to in-
fect all the virtualized platform forces the anti-virus suites to move their product
downto the hypervisor. And again, an iterating challenge will be to identify the
underlying hypervisor to exploit its vulnerabilities [14] [13].
1 http://2012.hackitoergosum.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/HES-2012-
jbrossard fdemetrescu-Hardware-Backdooring-is-pratical.pdf
2 http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/hardware-attacks-backdoors-and-electronic-
component-qualification/
Finally, a new task specific to virtualization is migration of VMs. This process,
from the deactivation, the transfer and the resuming of a VM with all its con-
figuration is a new problem to care about. The attacker could try to replace the
guenuine VM by a malicious one. If the blob is not protected enough, he could
also try to get some secrets.
A threat to homogeneity of embedded systems has been pointed out due to virtu-
alization as too strong isolation can be a flaw for cooperation between process [1].
This means that forbidding the share of informations between guests/applications
can force software designers to employ less secure solutions to get the needed
information.
An other approach in ordering malwares have been made in [9]. What is rele-
vant there is that one can again see that researchs had been made on an Intel
platform. Nevertheless, ARMv7 cores could possibly suffer from such malwares
due to the only CPU mode left for both guests and applications: the user mode.
There is a special device in ARM architectures which is called TrustZone and
act partly on the hardware side and partly on the software side. The main prob-
lem with this secure device is the way it can be programmed. It is not well
documented and not easy to play with. Recently vulnerability was detected and
presented at the Black Hat USA 2014 conference in [16] and [18] in the Hack-
InParis conference 2013. More that this, when one codes an application in the
TrustZone, one must send the package to the motherboard provider to be signed
and install at boot. So the keys of our own security are lawfully given to them.
There is also some vulnerabilities in TPM implementations. In some TCG-
enabled platforms, communication channels (buses) between TPM, RAM and
microprocessor could be unprotected. Moreover, microprocessors could use an
external boot ROM to store the Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM).
This CRTM is a a piece of executable code starting the measurement of boot-
strapping components. It must be an immutable portion of the platform ini-
tialization code that executes itself on resets. If the ROM could be switched to
inject malicious boot code and compromise the chain of trust, TPM will be of
no use at all [5]. Recently, Rakshasa 1 malware proves to inhibit the use of TPM
of an Intel platform [3].
Even if trusted computing means confidence through the early powering of the
platform to the running of user high level applications, backdoors can be now
inserted at gate level and their identification be more and more difficult. And if
virtualization is introduced in embedded systems, with many VM, one have to
cope with an extended way to carry on guarantee of integrity to all underlying do-
mains. That’s why ,three topics have been identified to develop a solution which
is aimed to bring more insurance to the virtualization for embedded systems:
trusted computing that gives insurance, up-to-date hardware and virtualization
which mainly gives isolation.
1 http://fr.slideshare.net/endrazine/defcon-hardware-backdooring-is-practical
3 Contribution
What we propose in this article is to implement a solution as light as possible, to
offer integrity, confidentiality and authorization to an embedded hypervisor, con-
sidering TPM and virtual TPM implemented on an Zynq-7000 platform which
featuring both a general purpose processor (GPP) an FPGA on it. The objec-
tive should consist of (i) an hardware IP which will contain new developments
(blocks), reuse of some of the opensource best ideas and as secure as possible
against hardware attacks, (ii) hypercalls extensions for the hypervisor and (iii)
a software library containing some of the main functions implemented in C and
assembly language. This secure solution is intended to act at two levels. The
hardware level will have to give trust of the integrity of IP to be plugged onto
the programmable logic: this will be an measured boot and not only secure boot.
The software level will have to complete and extend the chain of trust to the
end-user application: the VMM which must trust the launch of a virtual ma-
chine and an application inside a VM has to give guarantee of its integrity to
the uperlying operating system or remote system. The expected solution could
look like figure 6.
Fig. 6. Overview of the proposed solution. A leightweight hypervisor of Xen type with
some VM looking for trust in an FPGA implemented TPM
3.1 Threats Models
As we state previoulsy, we work on an entire platform. The trusted computing
base we are trying to define has to protect the system and must be able to pro-
tect its own security. See the definition of the trusted computing base in the
Orange Book Security [4]. And we can mention that if trust is good, control is
better to help reducing threats.
The hardware threats will be mentionned and taken in account only to minmize
what actually exists in the state of the art. In fact our studies has to find a
solution only for software attacks. We should care only about voltage spikes and
frequency shifts (i.e: power faults) that are important for the IP. We will have
no action on the ARM Cortex-A9 in terms of making a counter-measure for a
possible hole in the ARM Coretx-a9 processor. Likewise, we have no possible
action on a BIOS attack resulting in the corruption of it. And finally we won’t
fight against a possible hardware trojan or backdoor in the Zynq-7000 develop-
ment board. On an other CPU (OpenSparc) some solutions has been studied in
[28] and implemented.
On the software side, we can’t do anything against a badly coded application.
The hardware solution we propose to help virtualization is to give a proof of
integrity that even if the code is bad, this is this bad code that will be executed
as asked. The proposed solution will be implemented to give insurance that what
is running or about to run will be authorized to be launched. Another insurance
will be to try to give a guarantee that the running hypervisor has not been mod-
ified since the initialization of the platofrm.
At the HDL level, solutions have been implemented in ”Silencing Hardware
Backdoors” [28].
3.2 The Hardware Platform
The proposed IP should be built-up with several differents pieces (blocks). Some
of the pieces will be a part of our contribution and some picked up from open-
source world and/or academic researchs with the permission of their creators. Of
course, all the beginning work will consist of a definition of each of the elements,
their role, their data in and out. The main work will be the development of
the TPM/vTPM IP which will be feeded by a secure boot and which will offer
services to upper levels through a software stack.
The sensitive problem of the chain of trust The anchor of trust lean on
an secure and measured boot.
In secure boot, each part of loaded code will act as a proxy for the next element
to be loaded but it stops until all the checks made success. If a check fails then
the boot process stops and the platform is also stopped. The right term, in TCG
terminology, is verified boot but secure boot is more widely used: this is made
with comparison of signed parts of the boot process. But we have to monitor all
the boot process too but in a different way: measurement. First, the component
that measures the initial boot must be trusted. This CRTM is hardware-based.
Then, if the loaded piece of software has been measured and proves to be re-
liable, the component can measure the next software to be loaded, and again
there is a solid basis for trust. And this process is iterated for each step, ending
with the launching of an user application inside a VM as explain in figure 7.
On the Zynq-7000, however, the very first part of this process (called stage-0)
Fig. 7. measured boot: measuring, launching, reporting
is not accessible to the designer and/or the user! Unfortunately, the Zynq-7000
board does not offer the possiblity to modify its BIOS to make a Core Root of
Trust. On this point we will have to trust Xilinx because we will have no possible
action on the stage-0 boot and we have to make this hypothesis: hope that the
first part of the boot chain of the Zynq-7000 (stage-0) is strong enough to give us
insurance that we can plug our IP securely on the PL. These Xilinx restrictions
cannot be bypassed. But later, playing with authentification/encryption, we can
implement a large amount of partitions in our first stage boot loader (FSBL) or
second stage boot loader (SSBL) to allow the leaning of a rather secure solution.
And this solution will be the TPM/vTPM IP for a secured virtualization. This
can be seen in Xilinx documentation [29] and [30].
All the measurements made consecutively will be stored, for some parts in an
non-volatile memory (NVM) and other parts in volatile memory registers called
PCR. As a result, our solution will start on FSBL.
The I/O interface is the first element of the IP that will receive requests from
the software part of the systems and send back a result as soon as possible.
Two separated buses for in and out flows are a good solution to later develop
parallelism. The width of such a bus will be 32 bits to keep fully compatible with
the TCG current requirements.
A command received by this interface would have been verified at hypervisors
level and carry the id of the VM. The I/O interface will put this command in a
scheduler considering its priority (given by the hypervisor) and policy (given by
the TPM). One command will be executed at one time and then, this command
will ”own” all the TPM. This is shown in figure 8.
Before launching the execution of the command, the I/O interface will have to
verify that the previous command has ended its work and that the required
algorithms are available. If not the case, partial reconfiguration will load the
correct bitstream after having verified its integrity at last.
Some different operations will successively follow the following algorithm 1
Fig. 8. An important key to TPM functionnality
The internal bus of the TPM/vTPM will be shorter than the original one due
to the center position of the execution engine. The width of these buses only
need to match the width of a TPM2 command, so 32 bits. In fact, this layout
Algorithm 1 Managment of a TPM2 command issued from the VMM ou VM
but transmitted by DomT
Require: On reception of a valid TPM2 command
if (command header is correct) AND (handles exist) AND (authorizations are
valid) then
make it execute
wait for aknowledge
create the return header
else
send error with error id
report error
end if
has been chosen considering that having shorter buses is better a long one in
terms of side channel analysis aand and to avoid latencies.
The execution engine. One wonder in the case of programmable logic if it
would not be more interesting to think about an alternative layout for our TPM-
vTPM in a form of a star network. This will move the bulk of work to this unit
knowing that only one command coming from VMM or a VM owns the TPM at
one time (only one state is possible). The figure 9 also shows the I/O interface
will now only interact with one element and not all the possible element in a
TPM.
Fig. 9. In such a configuration, we clearly see that the execution engine is at the
crossroads between TPM and vTPM
The symmetric and asymmetric crypto engines. There are 2 sorts of en-
gines and TCG specifications explain that more than one engine can be deployed
in TPM. As place on the Zynq-7000 is not extensible, we have to consider partial
reconfiguration. Bitstreams of each algorithms will have to be shipped with the
FSBL and installed in non-volatile memory to be called as necessary. At this
point, we must notice that Zynq-7000 has already a RSA2048 algorithm for au-
thentication and an AES256/HMAC algorithm but only for decryption.
The algorithms we plan to use already exist and will be adapted to our devel-
opments. Ellyptic curve cryptography (ECC), of course is mandatory. Some of
the other cores could be found on opencores website 1 for example.
In our bitstreams, care will have be taken to reduce vulnerabilities of our de-
signs to avoid information leakage [8]. For this, flexibilty of SRAM FPGAs has
proved to be of a great advantages [2] to quickly upgrade, many times, a modified
version of an IP.
The PCR. The first 8 PCRs (number 0 to 7) will be used by all virtual PCRs
(vPCR) because they represent the platform secure state, so only one bank of
these PCR will be created in an read-only mode for the VM. The 16 others will
represent the VM personnal measures. See figure 10 for explanations. Hash algo-
rithm ID will have to be added to the measurement on each PCR to reflect the
property that a PCR can choose from more than one hash algorithm. TPM PCR
values will also have to be available both locally and remotely for attestation.
For example, a TPM will be able to digitally sign the PCR value to help remote
attestation and avoid tampering, corruption, and malicious software.
The key management for a TPM, depicted in figure 11, is not a public key
infrastrucure (PKI) as one can have in large systems. In fact, it will have to
be as reduced as possible considering that we are in an embedded system. The
Endorsement key (EK) will be kept and the Storage Root Key (SRK) protected
in NVM because they are the basis of all future credential extensions. The Attes-
tation Identity Key (AIK) derived from EK will be stored on a volatile memory,
inside our TPM (but encrypted). AIK will be used to sign data and an EK Cre-
dential. It is in fact a X.509 v3 certificate designed to issue credentials for other
restricted signing keys (Attestation Keys) [27]. So, this credential will be used to
quote (validate) AIK of VM. All the keys (except for the TPM) will be created
in our TPM and will be independant from each other for migration purpose.
the Random Number Generation (RNG) has two use cases in a TPM:
internally, generate keys and externally generate key using software or feed an
pseudo-RNG. That’s why, one of the uses of a TPM is to feed /dev/random on a
linux box. These utilizations will be preserved and extended to the use by vTPM.
1 www.opencores.org
Fig. 10. a VMM will include one READ-ONLY link to the original 0 to 8 PCR bank
and a dedicated 9-23 PCR bank
3.3 The hypervisor
We will work on a fork of EmbeddedXen. We know that specifications from the
TCG are to be followed in differents domains of this consortium if we look for
a minimum of compatibility. But, too much specifications deployed on a small
part of silicium would result in non-sense developments. Our work will be to get
the specifications we think to be of a prime importance for security knowing that
all of them will not be implemented on a SoC (for example: whole policies spec-
ifications on a small embbeded system whose configurations are often static).
We will try to respect as far as possible recommandations from XenProject
to implement security on the Zynq-7000 board. For example: all extra-services
(even security) should not not be implemented in Dom0 but must have a little
VM dedicated to them. This is done to not enlarge the Trusted Computing Base
(TCB) which is the area of code exposed to attackers.
We also have to develop some hypercalls to catch all the requests to the TPM/vTPM
send by the VM but also by the VMM in the case of launching a VM and realize
an integrity check before.
This little VM will only manage the demand/response to/from the TPM. It will
provide some little services like checking the validity of a command, avoiding
deny of service (DOS) attack to the TPM by counting the number of sendings
from a VM, software attestation of the source (signing with a dedicated private
key in the VM and attesting with its public counterpart in the I/O interface of
the TPM), adding an predefined ID of the callling VM to the send command for
further identification and management of the request/answers, for a short list.
All the TPM2 commands will not be implemented (due to lack of time and may
Fig. 11. Key managment as explained in [22]
be place on the silicon area). Basic operations will first be done followed later
by more evoluted ones. Here, we must notice that all TPM2 commands have a
description in C language which helps for rapid implementation.
The TSS offered to the VM will not be as detailled as it should be for a com-
plete implementation. Two distinct parts will be implemented in our DomT: One
in kernel mode called trusted device driver (TDD) et one in user-mode called
trusted core services (TCS). TDD which run in kernel mode will be implemented
as the only link between the TPM and the rest of the platform (including the
VM managment Dom0). In the VM, the trusted service provider (TSP) will be
the only access point for a TPM/vTPM request. One can again see that the
DomT is at the crossroads between software and hardware in the figure 6 of this
article.
4 Conclusion and future works
There is two parts in our works. One leans on hardware and have to code into
VHDL plus firmware in C/assembly language. One leans on software and offer
services upon an already existing but modified hypervisor.
We think this solution is an interesting one by the way the hypervisor can be
modified wihout side effects to the trust offered at different levels. The IP can
also be modified and the hypervisor will not be impacted by theses evolutions.
The supporting Zynq-7000 board has extended capacities (ASIC/FPGA) that
allows this solution should ideally be a ”plugin”. One great challenge is to make
a complete system where latencies will not be a major drawback. One other
point to care about is the size of the IP. There may be some trade-offs in imple-
mentations to make there.
The TPM-vTPM IP is the most heavy work to realize, the basis of all future
work that could be further imagined. The first bloc to be initiated is the I/O in-
terface, then will follow the internal bus, the execution engine, the PCR/vPCR,
the crypto-engines and so on.
At upper software level, little changes are to be made to the chosen hypervisor.
At first a software stack to allow developpers to use hardware IP services for
each VM. And second, the implementation of a small VM dedicated to the man-
agment of all the transactions with the TPM/vTPM. The last part of the work
belongs to the software engineer in the use the avaliable calls to the TPM.
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